Black-box accumulation (BBA) is a building block which enables a privacy-preserving implementation of point collection and redemption, a functionality required in a variety of user-centric applications including loyalty programs, incentive systems, and mobile payments. By definition, BBA+ schemes (Hartung et al. CCS '17) offer strong privacy and security guarantees, such as unlinkability of transactions and correctness of the balance flows of all (even malicious) users. Unfortunately, the instantiation of BBA+ presented at CCS '17 is, on modern smartphones, just fast enough for comfortable use. It is too slow for wearables, let alone smart-cards. Moreover, it lacks a crucial property: For the sake of efficiency, the user's balance is presented in the clear when points are deducted. This may allow to track owners by just observing revealed balances, even though privacy is otherwise guaranteed. The authors intentionally forgo the use of costly range proofs, which would remedy this problem. We present an instantiation of BBA+ with some extensions following a different technical approach which significantly improves efficiency. To this end, we get rid of pairing groups, rely on different zero-knowledge and fast range proofs, along with a slightly modified version of Baldimtsi-Lysyanskaya blind signatures (CCS '13). Our prototype implementation with range proofs (for 16 bit balances) outperforms BBA+ without range proofs by a factor of 2.5. Moreover, we give estimates showing that smart-card implementations are within reach.
Introduction
A variety of applications such as mobile payments, toll collection, or loyalty and incentive programs follow the same basic principle: certain types of points are collected and redeemed. From a user's perspective this should be done in a privacy-preserving way. The operator requires protection against any kind of frauds. This basic functionality has been formally captured by [21, 24] , where a general building block called BBA(+) for privacypreserving point collection is presented. BBA+ is a framework where users create a token (a wallet) and then use it to collect or spend points. It offers strong privacy guarantees. For example, transactions are unlinkable, even those before and after a user was corrupted and all secrets were leaked.
The protocols for collecting and spending points are offline in the sense that no connection to a central database or entity is required. Thus, double-spending detection is needed to prevent reuse of old token states. This ensures that a user cannot skip the collection of negative points (i.e. spent points) by simply reusing an old token, as this will reveal his identity.
Unfortunately, the instantiation of BBA+ given in [21] comes with some drawbacks: one is its reliance on Groth-Sahai zero-knowledge proofs [20] , which require a large amount of computations in pairing groups and all other building blocks to also work in this setting. This leads to slow performance on weak hardware and makes it unsuited for usage on smart cards, where even with a dedicated co-processor for pairing-based operations [36] , evaluation of a pairing takes about 160 ms and multiplication in G 2 about 100 ms (for the Fp254BNb and Fp254n2BNb curves). For point collection/redemption the user has to compute ≈ 100 multiplications in G 2 alone, which already takes 10 s.
BBA+ also requires spending operations to reveal the current balance. This may allow the system operator to track a (anonymous) user by just observing balances in spending operations. In the end, this may even help to identify this user. So, while the privacy guarantees ensure that nothing but the balance is leaked, this may not be enough. This attack on user privacy is especially relevant in scenarios where a user spends points (much) more often than he collects them, such as mobile payments. To protect from this attack, range proofs, e.g. [10] , could be used. That is, instead of revealing the balance, a ZK proof of sufficient funds is performed. Since range proofs are expensive and would make BBA+ impractical, especially with the techniques used in [21] , the authors refrained from using them.
Our Contribution
Using the Commit-then-Blind-Sign Principle.
In BBA+, tokens (wallets) consist essentially of (a commitment to) balance, serial number, and a signature (on the commitment). In an interaction, the serial number is revealed, the signature verified, the balance updated, and a new signature (on the updated commitment) is issued. Reuse of a serial number indicates double spending. To achieve authenticity of wallets and prevent tampering, the signature is used. To attain unlinkability, BBA+ cannot send the signature in the plain, as this would link the interaction with the one which issued the signature. The solution in [21] is to prove possession of a valid signature (on a randomized commitment) in zero-knowledge. One may call this the "commit-sign-prove" principle. Our approach is different: We use a blind signature, so that a newly issued signature is unknown to the issuer, and can later be shown in the plain. This "commit-then-blind-sign" principle also simplifies our construction and security proofs. To this end, a suitable signature scheme without pairings is needed. To the best of our knowledge the only existing scheme [5] satisfying our requirements is only known to be secure under sequential executions. We need security under concurrent executions, and thus present a slight modification of [5] and prove EUF-CMA security in the generic group model. Under sequential security, only one protocol may run at any time. This is a nonsensical assumption for a distributed system such as BBW, so we allow malicious users to attack by running several executions concurrently, arbitrarily interleaved. Security in this setting is harder to achieve. Pairing-free. Our protocol does not rely on pairing groups. While pairing groups are used to construct many primitives, most notably the non-interactive zeroknowledge proofs [20] used in [21] , they require extra structure. This extra structure has led to recent improvements in finding discrete logarithms in those groups (c.f. [7, 26] ), necessitating the use of larger parameters to maintain ≈128 bit security, resulting in slower algorithms. Additionally, the fastest currently known elliptic curves (for example FourQ [15] ) use techniques for fast scalar-point multiplication that are not applicable to pairing groups. Moreover, evaluating pairings is expensive. Thus, when targeting constrained devices, it is useful to avoid the need for pairing groups. Range Proofs. When a user spends points, BBA+ discloses the current balance in the clear, which opens possible attacks on privacy. We implement efficient range proofs (Bulletproofs [10] ), which show in zero-knowledge that a user has sufficient funds. Removing the Trapdoor. Defining the legitimate balance of a wallet/token requires a way to link transactions to that wallet, but transactions need to be unlinkable. To solve this dilemma, Hartung et al. [21] introduce a trapdoor only known to a trusted third party which allows to track users. This trapdoor is only intended for definitional purposes but knowledge of it eliminates any privacy guarantees. We define a new property called simulation-linkability, and show how to circumvent the need for such a trapdoor by relying on interactive proof systems, where standard rewinding techniques replace the trapdoor. Thus, linkability is possible only within the security proof, but not in reality where rewinding users is not possible. Attributes. Our construction allows embedding of attributes into tokens. This can be used for different purposes. For example, it is possible to embed an expiration date into all tokens. If tokens are valid for, say 6 months, then double-spending information for older tokens can safely be deleted, keeping the database small. This may also be used to limit the amount of damage that can be inflicted through double-spending a stolen token. Other use cases include embedding of discounts or age verification, for example children or senior pricing, in pre-payment systems. Implementation. To evaluate the suitability of our construction for use on constrained devices, we implemented our BBW instantiation and measured execution times on a smartphone. For 16 bit balances, we estimate a run-time of 122 ms on the user side (without communication). For the system side, we measure a run-time of 182 ms, which, considering that the system side may use more powerful hardware, is good enough. The total communication is about 4 kB. We also provide estimations for smart cards based on the number of multiplications required, where only 68 are needed for 16 bit ranges. This results in approximately 4 s for 256 bit curves on the MultOS 4.3.1 card and 1.5 s for a card with coprocessor for ECC operations. Compared to BBA+, point collection is 5.6 times faster while transmitting half as much data. Spending points is 6 times faster when performing range proofs for 16 bit values, and needs roughly a quarter of the communication of BBA+ (with 16 bit range proofs). This makes our scheme well suited for privacy-preserving pre-payment systems on constrained devices such as smartphones or wearables and provides a step towards privacy-preserving wallets on smart cards. Finally, we note that 16 bit are already enough for many applications. For example, the EU limited anonymous payments to 150 EUR [25] .
Further Related Work
Intuitively, the problem of anonymous point collection seems to be solvable using (transferable) e-cash. Hartung et al. [21] already argued why this does not work though: Roughly speaking, in traditional offline e-cash, e.g. [13] , withdrawing a coin is identifying and coins cannot be transferred, thus the accumulator can neither execute the withdraw protocol with the user nor transfer coins it withdrew itself from the bank. Using transferable e-cash such as [6] where anonymous and unlinkable transfers of coins is possible (under certain assumptions), the accumulator could withdraw coins and transfer them to the user. However, an impossibility result by Canard and Gouget [14] implies, that if the issuer, accumulator, and verifier collude, transactions can be linked. Additionally, users would be free to transfer coins arbitrarily among each other, allowing for pooling of points which is not desired in certain applications.
In [32] a privacy-preserving prepaid system for public transportation is constructed. However, payment is done by first paying the maximum possible transportation fee and then getting a refund based on the actual ride taken, where the possible refund values are encoded in the system parameters. While this might be practical in the case of public transportation with only a small amount of different prices, it cannot be extended to a general two-way payment system.
Besides BBA+, which we already discussed, [30] implements an anonymous and unlinkable incentive scheme called uCentive. However, the scheme targets a simpler scenario than we do: points are not accumulatable and double-spending detection is done online. Moreover, security and privacy protocols are stated only informally and no proofs are given.
In [5] Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) are presented, a building block for anonymous credentials equipped with attributes. ACL does not provide a twoway payment system, but may be used as building block for one. However, security is only guaranteed for sequential interactions, a limitation not practical for realworld scenarios. Their scheme has been implemented on a smart card [22] and shown to be fairly practical.
Dimitriou [17] constructed an efficient privacypreserving point accumulation scheme based on ACL. However, security is based on informal claims which do not reflect the capabilities of real-world adversaries. Problems stemming from concurrent executions are ignored, as made evident by the use of the signature scheme of [5] which is only sequentially secure. Additionally, spending points reveals the user's identity.
In [23] a privacy-preserving system for toll collection is built based on BBA+. In their system, users accumulate debt while driving and pay at regular intervals. The authors extend BBA+ to address the challenges posed by real-world interactions in this scenario, such as broken or lost user hardware. Interestingly, they avoid the need for range proofs by following a post-payment instead of a pre-payment approach. Their scheme is still based on Groth-Sahai proofs and thus pairing groups.
Lastly, privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies such as Dash [1] and ZCash [2, 33] provide another way of anonymous two-way payments. However, these require a reliable online connection, while our scheme explicitly allows offline transactions. Furthermore, Dash comes without formal security and privacy definitions, while in ZCash transactions are only confirmed after several minutes, which makes them unsuitable for time-sensitive scenarios, such as paying in a store using one's smartphone. Additionally, using cryptocurrencies it is again possible for users to transfer and pool funds among themselves, which is not desired in certain applications.
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some cryptographic assumptions and informally describe cryptographic building blocks used. Section 3 describes the BBA+ scheme as introduced by Hartung et al. [21] , and Section 4 describes our modifications to address weaknesses of BBA+. In Section 5 we detail how we instantiated our construction, while Section 6 explains the signature scheme used. Finally, in Section 7 we provide and discuss performance metrics obtained by implementing our construction on a smartphone.
Preliminaries
We use the common notation to describe cryptographic protocols and define their security. By n, we denote the security parameter. For two functions f (n) and g(n) we write f ≈ g if |f − g| ≤ negl(n) for a negligible function negl(n). We use additive notation for (commutative) groups of prime order p. Group elements are always denoted by upper case letters, scalars (i.e. elements of Z p ) by lower case letters.
Assumptions
Definition 2.1 (Group Generator). A group generator is a PPT algorithm gp := (G, G, p) ← SetupGrp(1 n ) that on input of a security parameter 1 n outputs the description of a cyclic group G of prime order p with |p| = n and generator G.
Definition 2.2 (Discrete Logarithm Assumption).
We say the DLOG assumption holds with regard to SetupGrp if the advantage Adv dlog SetupGrp,A (n) defined as
is negligible in n for all PPT algorithms A.
Definition 2.3 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption).
We say the DDH assumption holds with regard to SetupGrp if the advantage Adv ddh SetupGrp,A (n) defined as
Building Blocks
For formal definitions of the building blocks used, see Appendix A.
Homomorphic Commitments
A commitment scheme allows the committing party to commit (using Com) to some message m from some message space M while keeping it secret. At a later point, m can then be revealed together with a "proof" that it has indeed been fixed during the committing step (verifiable using Open). Homomorphic commitments allow adding of commitments in a way that allows opening of the result to the sum of the original messages.
Signatures
A signature scheme allows a signer (with a public and a secret key) to sign (using Sign) a message m with his secret key so that anyone with knowledge of his public key can verify (using Verify) that m was indeed signed by the signer and has not been modified since. For privacy-preserving protocols, signatures with additional protocols BlindSign and BlindVerify for blind signature issuance and verification can be used. Recall that EUF-CMA security is the standard security notion for signatures. It asserts an adversary, which is given a signing oracle which signs any messages of its choice, cannot produce a signature on a "fresh" message (of its choice).
Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
A zero-knowledge (ZK) proof allows a prover to convince someone (called the verifier) of the truth of a statement (usually membership in some NP language) without revealing any information beside the validity of the statement. A ZK proof of knowledge (PoK) convinces the verifier that not only the statement is true, but also the prover "knows" a witness for it (again without revealing any information about the witness). We use the notion of witness-extended emulation introduced by Groth and Ishai [19] to formalize knowledge of the prover.
BBA+ Description
Hartung et al. [21] introduced a generic building block for privacy-preserving point collection called BBA+. BBA+ allows anonymous and unlinkable collection and redemption of points, while ensuring users can't overor under-claim their balance, and preventing users from trading points among themselves. It also supports offline double-spending detection, avoiding the need of a permanent connection to some centralized database. On a high level, the BBA+ framework involves three types of parties: A Trusted Third Party (TTP) generates the common reference string, together with a trapdoor that allows linking of transactions, once to setup the system. It does not need to interact with anyone afterwards. Operators of the system can be divided into three roles: the Issuer (I) responsible for issuing new tokens to users, the Accumulator (AC) from which points are collected and the Verifier (V) to whom points can be spent. All operators have to trust each other and in particular share the same secret key. Additionally, the operators operate a shared central database in which they store double-spending information. Connection to this database does not have to be permanently available, as double-spending can be detected after-the-fact when inserting values into this database: spending the same token twice results in two transactions with the same serial number, and if two such transactions are detected, it is possible to retrieve the identity of the misbehaving user (together with a proof thereof). Users have a token (piggy-bank) with which they want to collect points. They are in possession of a public and secret key. The public key is used to identify the user in the system, and is assumed to be bound to some kind of physical ID (e.g. passport, social security number, etc.). It is assumed that ensuring uniqueness of keys and verifying the physical ID is done out-of-band before interacting with the BBA+ protocols. To become a participant of the scheme, a user performs the token issuing protocol with the issuer, during which knowledge of the secret key corresponding to the claimed identity is proven. Then, a user can use this token to accumulate points by running the Add protocol with the accumulator and spend these points by running the Sub protocol with the verifier. (For more intuitive notation, we use Add and Sub instead of Acc and Ver as in [21] .) Definition 3.1 (BBA+ Scheme [21] ). A BBA+ scheme consists of PPT algorithms Setup, IGen, UGen, deterministic polynomial time algorithms UVer, IdentDS, VerifyGuilt and interactive protocols Issue, Add and Sub. At the core of the scheme lies a token τ, containing a unique serial number s and the balance w ∈ V. It is bound to the owner's identity (i.e. the user's public key). Setup: The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter n and outputs a common reference string crs and a trapdoor td. IGen(crs) generates a key pair (PK I , sk I ) for the issuer, which is also shared with the accumulator and verifier. UGen(crs) generates a user key pair (PK U , sk U ). UVer, given a user key pair (PK U , sk U ), a token τ and a balance w outputs a bit b indicating whether τ is a valid token with balance w owned by the user with public key PK U . Token generation: The protocol Issue is executed between a user U, given his own key pair (PK U , sk U ) and PK I ; and the issuer I, given PK U and the issuer key pair (PK I , sk I ). Upon successful execution, U outputs a token τ with initial balance 0 for the key pair (PK U , sk U ). Both U and I additionally output a bit b U /b I that indicates whether they accept the run.
Collecting points: To collect points, the protocol Add is executed between user U with token τ containing serial number s and balance w and the accumulator AC on common input v (the amount of points to be collected). At the end of the protocol, U outputs an updated token τ * (with balance w + v) while AC outputs a double-spending tag dstag containing s. They additionally again output a bit b U /b AC indicating whether they accepted the run. Redeeming points: To spend points, the Sub protocol is executed between a user U and a verifier V. It has the same inputs and outputs as Add, with the exception that the current balance is also part of the common input (i.e. the verifier learns the user's balance in the clear). This allows the verifier to ensure that the user has a sufficient balance to spend the desired amount of points, or can be used in a post-payment system to clear the accumulated debt. Detection of double-spending: Using the same token twice results in two transactions with the same serial number. At regular intervals (or whenever an online connection is available), operators insert the doublespending tags generated through the Add and Sub protocols into the central database. While doing so, for each inserted tag dstag they check whether the serial number s of it is already contained in the database. If this is the case, the corresponding double-spending tag dstag is retrieved from the database and IdentDS(dstag, dstag ) is used to identify the offending user: IdentDS, given two double-spending tags, returns the public key PK U of a user together with a proof of guilt π or returns an error ⊥. In following legal action, VerifyGuilt can then be used to convince a judge (or anyone else) of the misbehavior: VerifyGuilt, given a user public key PK U and a proof of guilt π outputs a bit b indicating whether the user with public key PK U is guilty of double-spending.
The BBA+ scheme comes with strong security and privacy guarantees, which can be divided in the system side and the user side: Security for the system side consists of three goals:
1. Tokens can only be created and used in the name of their legitimate owners (owner-binding). 2. A given user cannot claim more (or less) points than he has collected up to that point, unless an old version of a token is presented (balance-binding) 3. Users presenting old versions of their token can be identified after the fact (double-spending detection). Security for the user side consists of two goals:
1. Users should have the privacy guarantee that their transactions are anonymous and cannot be used for tracking (privacy-preserving) 2. Nobody should be able to forge a proof that a user has committed a double-spending (false-accusation protection) To formally define what it means to use a token in the name of someone and what the amount of points a user has collected is, a way to link individual transactions to the owner of the token is required. In BBA+, this is achieved by having the TTP generate a trapdoor which allows linking of transactions to individual users. More formally, they defined a property called "trapdoor linkability" which requires that all transactions result in some linking information which can be used, together with the linking trapdoor, to identify the corresponding user via a deterministic algorithm ExtractUID.
In their security experiments formalizing above goals, an adversary A may concurrently interact with an honest issuer, accumulator, and verifier an arbitrary (bounded by the polynomial run-time) number of times. The adversary, playing the role of the user, may behave dishonestly and not follow the corresponding protocols. In order to formalize this adversarial setting, Hartung et al. [21] defined oracles the adversary may query:
MalIssue(PK U ) lets the adversary initiate the Issue protocol with an honest issuer I, provided that there is no pending MalIssue call for PK U and PK U has also not been used in a successful call to MalIssue before. MalAcc(v) is used by the adversary to initiate the Add protocol with AC for input v. MalVer(v, w) is used by the adversary to initiate the Sub protocol with V for inputs w and v. We say that a call to an oracle is successful if the honest party represented by the oracle accepts the run (i.e. the accept bit b I /b AC /b V is 1).
Then they defined owner-binding, which states that a token bound to some user public key PK U can only be obtained with knowledge of the corresponding sk U and that tokens used during Add/Sub must be bound to a public key for which the Issue protocol has been performed.
Next, they require that, unless double-spending occurred, a user cannot claim a different balance than the exact sum of points collected up to that point: 
is negligible in n.
Experiment Exp bb BBA+,A (crs, td) ← Setup(1 n ), (PK I , sk I ) ← IGen(crs) b ← A MalIssue,MalAcc,MalVer (PK I ) The experiment outputs 1 iff A made a successful call to MalVer with extracted user public-key PK U such that -all successful MalIssue/MalAcc/MalVer calls produced unique token version numbers -the claimed balance w ∈ V does not equal the sum of previously collected accumulation values v for PK U , i.e.
where V PK U is the list of all accumulation values v ∈ V that appeared in previous successful calls to MalAcc or MalVer for which PK U could be extracted using ExtractUID. Since they desired their system to be offline (i.e. without the need of a permanent connection to some centralized database), users cannot be prevented from using the same token twice. Thus, they require that a user doing so is detected, revealing his identity and providing a proof that he did cheat which can be verified by anyone. User security is defined using the real/ideal world paradigm. In the real world, the adversary interacts with oracles implementing the real user protocols. In the ideal world, the adversary interacts with a simulator. The simulator has to play the role of the oracles, but without receiving any private user information. To this end, it is given access to a simulation trapdoor for the crs. It is then demanded that no PPT adversary can distinguish between the real and the ideal world. For an in-depth explanation of the different oracles used see [21] . is negligible in n.
Lastly, false-accusation protection guarantees that users cannot be framed for a double-spending they did not commit. 
From BBA+ to BBW
Several shortcomings of the BBA+ scheme, as described in Section 3, were discussed in the introduction. To recall, it relies on Groth-Sahai (GS) zero-knowledge proofs [20] together with pairing-based cryptographic primitives. Since the protocol is interactive anyway, we can replace GS proofs with more efficient interactive proofs, namely Sigma protocols [29] . Now we are not bound by the constraints of GS proofs anymore, in particular, pairing-free instantiations become possible.
Another drawback of BBA+ was the need to reveal the current balance to spend points, as this can impact real-world privacy guarantees. Hartung et al. consider range-proofs to ensure a sufficient balance as a solution, but refrain from using them due to poor performance. We introduce a balance space V = {0, . . . , 2 l−1 } (which is sufficiently small to avoid problems caused by overflows, e.g. 2|V| < |Z p |). We employ Bulletproofs [10] , which are very efficient range-proofs compatible with our existing zero-knowledge proofs.
The security guarantees of BBA+ require a method to define the correct balance of a user for the security proof, while still ensuring user privacy. Hartung et al. [21] solve this by introducing a trapdoor that allows to completely abolish privacy, which is only known to a trusted third party (and thus available in the security proofs, but assumed to not be used in the real world). Through our use of interactive zero-knowledge protocols, we can make use of a technique called rewinding to achieve the same result, without the need of a trapdoor. Rewinding denotes the process of running an adversary A to receive some output and then rewind A to some previous state to let it re-run with the same randomness but different input (e.g. zero-knowledge challenge). While this is possible during security proofs (where black-box access to the program of an adversary is assumed), it is not possible in the real world, where it is not possible for a system operator to re-set the user's hardware. Formally, we introduce a new property for BBA+ schemes, called simulation linkability which replaces trapdoor linkability introduced in [21] . As a side effect, since our common reference string is indeed only a common random string, and there is no trapdoor anymore, it is possible to set up our scheme without a trusted third party by generating the crs for example through evaluating a cryptographic hash function on e.g. the timestamp during initialization. Note also that, unlike in BBA+, a misbehaving TTP that leaks information on how the crs was generated (including e.g. the discrete logarithms of the elements in the crs) to the operator does not impact user privacy (though leaking this information to users allows them to claim arbitrary balances and attributes).
Another drawback of BBA+ that hinders deployment in the real world is the need to store doublespending tags forever. We solve this problem by adding attributes to the token that can be revealed during Add and Sub interactions. Their main use is to define validity periods for tokens, which allows to discard doublespending tags after the validity period expired. Additionally, they allow for efficient verification of other attributes the user may have, such as discounted prices for students or age-verification for purchases (such as alcohol). This allows checking of the required attributes once during token generation (by e.g. checking a student card or passport) instead of for each transaction, removing the need to show identifying documents. We want to note though that care has to be taken when choosing the possible attributes, as they might allow linking of users if chosen poorly. In our envisioned scenarios, either the majority of users share the same attributes (e.g. there are only 2 validity periods in use at any given time) or the attributes are already clear from the context (e.g. to be able to buy alcohol, the user must be above the legal age). The user learns (during token creation) which attributes will be part of his token and during each interaction chooses which attributes will be revealed (outside of our protocol), and needs to not accept attributes that would violate his privacy. As a concrete example, we propose validity periods of six months, ending every three months, so new tokens are always valid for between three and six months (depending on how close to the end of a quarter the token is issued). This allows to keep the database of double-spending tags small while also ensuring that approximately half the users share the same attribute. We want to stress that only attributes required for a given transaction are revealed (e.g. when no age-restricted goods are to be purchased, there is no need to reveal the age-verification attribute).
Definition 4.1 (BBW Scheme).
A BBW Scheme consists of PPT algorithms Setup, IGen, UGen, deterministic polynomial time algorithms UVer, IdentDS, VerifyGuilt and interactive protocols Issue, Add and Sub. At the core of the scheme lies a token τ that contains a unique serial number s, the tokens balance w ∈ V and some attribute(s) attr and is bound to the owner's identity (i.e. the user's public key). Setup: The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter n and outputs a common reference string crs. IGen(crs) generates a key pair (PK I , sk I ) for the issuer, which is also shared with the accumulator and verifier. UGen(crs) generates a user key pair (PK U , sk U ). UVer given a user key pair (PK U , sk U ), a token τ, attribute attr and a balance w outputs a bit b indicating whether τ is a valid token with public attribute attr and balance w owned by the user with public key PK U . Token generation: The protocol Issue is executed between a user U, given some attribute attr, his own key pair (PK U , sk U ) and PK I ; and the issuer I, given PK U , the same attribute attr and the issuer key pair (PK I , sk I ). Upon successful execution, U outputs a token τ with initial balance 0 and public attribute attr for the key pair (PK U , sk U ). Both U and I additionally output a bit b U /b I that indicates whether they accept the run. Collecting points: To collect points, the protocol Add is executed between a user U with token τ containing serial number s, balance w and public attribute attr and the accumulator AC on common input (attr, v) (the public attribute of the token and the amount of points to be collected). At the end of the protocol, U outputs an updated token τ * (with balance w + v) while AC outputs a double-spending tag dstag containing s. They additionally again output a bit b U /b AC indicating whether they accepted the run. Spending points: To spend points, the Sub protocol is executed between a user U and a verifier V. It has the same inputs and outputs as Add, except that the new balance w * is computed as w * = w − v. Additionally, the user proves (in zero-knowledge) that w ≥ v holds. Detection of double-spending: IdentDS, given two double-spending tags, returns the public key PK U of a user together with a proof of guilt π or returns an error ⊥. VerifyGuilt given a user public key PK U and a proof of guilt π outputs a bit b indicating whether the user with public key PK U is guilty of double-spending.
To remove the need of the trapdoor for ExtractUID, we formally define what it means for a scheme to be simulation-linkable. The main difference to trapdoorlinkable is that there is no need for a trapdoor but the algorithm is allowed to fail with negligible probability.
For some fixed n ∈ N, crs ← Setup(1 n ) T Add n,crs denotes the set of transcripts (including AC's output) resulting from any Add protocol run accepted by AC with any (potentially malicious) party, and T Sub n,crs analog for V.
Definition 4.2 (Simulation-Linkability). A BBW scheme is called simulation-linkable if it satisfies the following conditions:
Completeness: Let n ∈ N, (crs, td) ← Setup(1 n ) and tr ∈ T Add n,crs . Then there exist inputs PK U , sk U , τ, w and random choices for an honest user U and honest accumulator AC such that an Add protocol run between U and AC with these inputs and random choices leads to the same transcript tr. The same holds for all tr ∈ T Sub n,crs with respect to Sub.
Extractability: There exists a PPT algorithm
ExtractUID that, given two related transcripts tr 1 , tr 2 ∈ T Add n,crs (or T Sub n,crs resp.) produced by the interaction of a honest user U with public key PK U and the honest accumulator AC (or honest verifier V resp.) outputs the public key PK U . Two transcripts tr 1 , tr 2 are called related if they are identical up to the point where the zero-knowledge challenge is sent, and then contain different challenges and different responses. Additionally, there exists an expected PPT algorithm GenerateTranscripts that, given access to a transcript oracle O = U, AC (or O = U, V resp.) outputs two related transcripts tr 1 , tr 2 ∈ T Add n,crs (resp. tr 1 , tr 2 ∈ T Sub n,crs ) with overwhelming probability. GenerateTranscripts is allowed to rewind O and resume with fresh randomness for AC (resp. V).
Remark 1.
Since ExtractUID only receives transcripts tr 1 , tr 2 ∈ T Add n,crs (resp. T Sub n,crs ), and completeness in above definition requires that any such transcript can be produced by an honest user, the output of ExtractUID is well defined even for malicious users U * .
We note that our version of ExtractUID only outputs the user's public key with overwhelming probability (instead of always, as is the case for trapdoor linkability). Thus, it is necessary to extend all security experiments: the adversary additionally also wins if he is able to perform a successful interaction for which ExtractUID fails to output the public key. Additionally, for user privacy, the ideal world oracles now need access to the user attributes where needed, but the oracle for Sub does not receive the balance anymore. The formal definitions are lengthy and can be found in Appendices D.3 and D.4.
Remark 2 (Modeling privacy for attributes).
Recall that modeling user security via the real/ideal paradigm ensures that a real-world adversary learns no more than an ideal-world adversary. However, if a (desired) privacy property does not hold in the ideal world, then neither need it hold in the real. Thus, we must assume that attributes are used in a privacy-preserving manner. Uniquely identifying attributes do not contradict real/ideal world security. However, due it is sufficient to study the impact of attributes on privacy in the ideal world. The impact on privacy is highly dependent on the setting. Thus, it has to be carefully analyzed individually for every application of BBW. In Section 4, we outlined some acceptable usage, such as children, adult, senior pricing earlier where a "physical world" adversary must learn the attributes anyway. Similarly, sensible implementations of expiration dates should preserve privacy, because at any time, a large portion of users share the same expiration date.
Instantiation
Recall that a token contains a signature on (a commitment to) the balance, serial number and some other values, which is verified in a transaction. Then to modify the balance, a new signature on (a commitment to) the updated balance and a new serial number is formed. To provide correctness on the one hand, and user privacy on the other hand, ZK proofs are used to hide sensible information while proving that the new commitment is formed correctly. Thus, to instantiate our scheme, we need to find a suitable and efficient zeroknowledge proof system and a compatible signature and commitment scheme. We have one algorithm SetupGrp that outputs the description of an elliptic curve group G of prime order p with generator G which is then used by all building blocks.
As already mentioned, for efficiency reasons we make use of sigma protocols for our ZK proofs. We make use of the generalized definition of a sigma protocol by Maurer [29] which is perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge. We extend it by replacing the challenge with a Blum coin-toss to achieve perfect composable zero-knowledge as proposed by Damgård [16] . To do so, we use the Pedersen commitment scheme for messages of length 1 (a single element of Z p ). We refer to this commitment scheme as C ZK in the following. Maurer's scheme allows proofs of knowledge for preimages of group-homomorphisms (where the homomorphism may depend on the statement being proven). We consider homomorphisms Φ : A → B, where A and B are of the form G n1 × Z n2 p . To prove that w ≥ v in the Sub protocol, we use range proofs. A range proof is a ZK proof that the content of a commitment lies within a given interval. We prove that w − v ∈ V, which is equivalent to w ≥ v as long as |Z p | > 2|V|. We use Bulletproofs [10] to implement the range proof, referred to as RP in the following.
For commitments, we make use of the Pedersen multi-commitment scheme, referred to as PC in the following, which allows to commit to a vector m l of messages in a single group element.
Choosing a signature scheme poses the greatest challenge: the running time of the scheme is dominated by verifying signatures (both in zero-knowledge and on the user side to ensure correct token creation). We need a signature scheme that allows signing of committed messages (i.e. signing a group element) and verification of such signatures in an unlinkable way. Additionally, both during the process of obtaining a signature as well as during verification, it must be possible to prove, in zero-knowledge, statements involving the content of the signed message. The latter requirement severely restricts the class of possible signature schemes. While structure-preserving signatures obviously fulfill our requirements, they rely on pairings. Normal blind signature schemes (without pairings) usually do not allow to (efficiently) prove statements about the content of the signed message (for example due to the use of a cryptographic hash function whose output is then signed). The same problem arises when using normal signatures to get a signature on a commitment and then prove knowledge of both the commitment and the signature in zero-knowledge (which satisfies unlinkability), as again the use of a hash-function on the message prevents efficient zero-knowledge proofs containing the content of the message. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [11, 12] introduced a class of signatures commonly referred to as CL-type signatures intended for usage in privacy-preserving protocols. CL-type signatures consist of a commitment scheme and a signature scheme and come with efficient (interactive) protocols to obtain signatures on committed messages and to prove knowledge of a signature in zero-knowledge, which are exactly the properties we require. Unfortunately, known CL-type signatures rely on either RSA groups ( [11] ) or pairings ( [12, 31] ). Thus, we decided to adapt the blind signature scheme of Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya [5] into a CL-type signature scheme. Since the authors only provided a proof for sequential security of their blind signature protocol (where the adversary must finish one interaction with the signer before he is allowed to start a new one), while we require concurrent security for our scheme (as it is implausible to assume an adversary cannot interleave protocol executions in a distributed setting as targeted by us), we also provide a proof of concurrent security in the generic group model which may be of independent interest. The resulting signature scheme is described in detail in Section 6.
Instantiating BBW
The scheme is summarized in Figures 3 and 5 to 7. In the following, we explain the details of the algorithms and protocols. Whenever a ZKPoK is conducted between parties, the verifying party aborts and outputs ⊥ if it does not accept the proof.
Setup: Setup, run by the trusted third party, generates a suitable group and the common reference string crs for the scheme, which consists of a common reference string crs com for the commitment scheme PC and a common reference string crs pok for the zero-knowledge scheme Z that is used in Issue, Add and Sub. IGen generates a key pair for the system operator, which simply consists of a key pair for the signature scheme S. UGen generates a key pair for a user, consisting of a secret key sk U (a random element in Z p ), and a public key PK U = sk U G, which is used as the users identity. Token generation: The protocol to issue new tokens is shown in Figure 5 . A token consists of a random serial number s ∈ Z p , a balance w ∈ V, the users secret key sk U ∈ Z p , and the double-spending information u 1 ∈ Z p , together with a valid signature σ (under the issuers public key PK I ) on the message m := (s, w, sk U , u 1 ). To ensure the serial number s is indeed random, it is chosen jointly by the user and the issuer (making use of the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme PC).
To obtain an initial token, the user forms a commitment C on (s ∈ Z p , 0, sk U , u 1 ), where s ← Z p is his random share of the serial number and u 1 ← Z p , with initial balance 0. He then performs a zero-knowledge proof P1 with the issuer to prove knowledge of the secret key corresponding to his public key PK U , knowledge of the content of the commitment C and to ensure that the balance is 0. The issuer verifies the zero- 
Fig. 3. Setup and Key Generation
Proof P1 (for the Issue protocol) Statement: crscom, C , PK U Witness s , sk U , u1, d so that
Additionally, a range proof that w − v ∈ V (using C RP ) is performed.
Fig. 4. Zero-Knowledge Proofs
if UVer(skU , τ, 0, attr) = 0 return (⊥, 0) else return (τ, 1) return 1
Fig. 5. Issue Protocol
knowledge proof, then chooses s ← Z p , uses the homomorphic property of PC to generate a commitment C on (s + s , 0, sk U , u 1 ) and then engages in an interaction of the protocol BlindSign of S to sign the tuple (s + s , 0, sk U , u 1 ) with his private key sk I . Finally, after receiving the signature through BlindSign, the user verifies that it is valid.
Collecting points: To collect points, the Add protocol described in Figure 6 is used. In the protocol, AC starts by choosing a random value u 2 ← Z p and sending it to U, who then computes the second part of the doublespending token (s, t) as t = sk U u 2 + u 1 . The user then prepares a new token by again forming a commitment C on (s , w, sk U , u 1 ), where s , u 1 ← Z p are new random values, while w is the same as in his existing token. The user then sends C and t together with the serial number s contained in his token to the accumulator and performs the ZKPoK P2 with AC to prove knowledge of a valid token and correct computation of t and C . After verifying the proof, AC adds his share s ← Z p to the new serial number as well as the amount of points collected v to the balance in C (again using the homomorphic property of PC). Then the user and AC again perform the BlindSign protocol to sign the new tuple (s + s , w + v, sk U , u 1 ). Finally, the user again checks that the resulting token is valid and contains the correct new balance. Spending points: The protocol Sub works mostly the same as Add, with the difference that v is subtracted from the balance and P3 contains a range proof that
Fig. 6. Add Protocol
Detection of double-spending: Algorithms IdentDS and VerifyGuilt are shown in Figure 7 . IdentDS exploits that the two double-spending tags are blinded by the same value u 1 to extract the users secret key. The users identity is then revealed by computing his public key.
VerifyGuilt checks that the value contained in the proof of guilt π is indeed the secret key corresponding to PK U .
UVer(PK I , PK U , sk U , τ, w, attr)
VerifyGuilt(PK I , PK U , π)
if πG = PK U return 1 else return 0 Fig. 7 . User verification of tokens and double-spending algorithms
Security of BBW
In the security games (see Section 3 as well as appendix B), the adversary engages in multiple, possibly concurrent and arbitrarily interleaved ZK arguments. We show by hybrid argument that this does not affect the possibility to extract witnesses from those arguments. The idea in the proof is to extract one witness at a time and view all oracle calls except the one for which the witness is being extracted as part of the adversary. This is possible since we do not rely on extracted information during interaction with the adversary, but only to determine whether the adversary was successful. For the full proof, see Appendix D.1.
In the following, we refer to an interactive protocol between an honest party and a (possibly) malicious party as complete if for every transcript tr of a transaction that results in the honest party accepting, there exists inputs and random choices for honest parties so that an interaction between them results in the same transcript. 
Theorem 5.3 (System Security).
If BBW is simulation-linkable, the premises of Theorem 5.1 and the DLOG assumption in G hold, PC is additively homomorphic and binding and S is EUF-CMA secure, then BBW is owner-binding (Definition B.1 
), balancebinding (Definition 3.3) and ensures double-spending detection (Definition B.2).
For the proofs, see Appendix D.3. Owner-binding wrt.
Issue is a straight-forward reduction to CDH. For ownerbinding wrt. Add/Sub, we show that any adversary able to win the game with non-negligible probability can be used to break EUF-CMA security of S. The proof for balance-binding closely follows the one in [21] . Equivocation of Pedersen commitments does not have to be considered explicitly anymore as it is covered by EUF-CMA security. Instead of building a graph based on signed commitments, a graph based on the unique serial numbers can be built. Then it can be shown that an adversary successfully attacking balance-binding can be used to break EUF-CMA security of S. Theorem 5.4 (User Security). If P1, P2 and P3 are composable zero-knowledge and PC is equivocable, then BBW is privacy-preserving, and if additionally the DLOG assumption holds in G, it is secure against false accusation of double-spending.
The proof is largely the same as in [21] . For details, see Appendix D.4. We make use of the simulation trapdoor (i.e. the equivocality trapdoors of the commitment scheme) to step-by-step remove private input from the oracles until we are left with the ideal-world oracles that do not receive any private input. The main difference to [21] is that the signature σ 1 is sent to the adversary during the protocol, and replacing it by a simulated one relies on the DDH assumption to be indistinguishable (see Appendix C.2).
The proof for false-accusation protection is straightforward and the same as in [21] .
Signature Scheme
Starting from the signature scheme of Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya [5] , we construct a CL-type signature scheme: Messages of arbitrary but fixed length l are first committed into a single group element using Pedersen commitments and then signed.
The scheme of Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya (called ACL) is a blind signature with attributes, where efficient ZK proofs regarding the attributes are possible. It is based on the blind signature scheme of Abe [3] and a blinded variant of the Pedersen commitment scheme: Given a Pedersen commitment C on m (with opening information d) and an additional generator Z (that is part of the crs), C = (γZ, γC) is also a commitment on m with opening information (d, γ) . Additionally, C and C are unlinkable (without knowledge of γ) under the DDH assumption. Below, we refer to this variant of Pedersen commitments as PCB.
We interpret these "attributes" as the message, which then allows for efficient ZK proofs regarding the message. The resulting scheme works roughly as follows. The signer has a real public key PK (of which he knows the corresponding secret key sk) and a "tag" public key Z (generated by a trusted party or by applying a cryptographic hash function to his public key, so that nobody knows the corresponding secret key). To sign a message m, a blinded Pedersen commitment C = (Z 1 , Z 2 ) is created (using the tag public key Z). A signature then consists of a non-interactive (via the Fiat-Shamir transformation) ZKPoK, proving knowledge of either the secret key sk or the discrete logarithms of Z 1 and Z 2 (which are not known to anyone). This construction allows for efficient ZK proofs involving m. To obtain blind signatures, a user sends C (together with a ZKPoK of the opening to m) to the signer, who then interactively performs the ZKPoK with the user. To obtain the challenge, the user queries the hash function (after applying appropriate blinding factors). This results in a signature that is unlinkable to any information received by the signer during signing. If the signer accepts the proof, they then engage in the interactive signing protocol to generate a blind signature. See Figure 8 for the description of the interactive signing protocol. (d, γ) , sends σ 1 to the verifier and performs a ZKPoK Π 2 of m and σ 2 such that PCB.Open(crs com , m, (Z,C), σ 2 ) = 1. The verifier checks that Verify 1 (crs, PK, σ 1 ) = 1 and Π 2 is valid. To implement Π 2 as a Σ-protocol, the equations to be shown can be rewritten as
where γ = γ −1 .
Remark 3. Modifications detailed above are mainly regarding notation and to remove the blind message and thus allow the EUF-CMA security definition and do not change ACL on a technical level. Theorem 6.2. Above signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure in the combined generic group and random oracle model.
Note that since BlindSign contains a ZKPoK of the message m, the set of messages that have been signed using the oracle for BlindSign is well defined, and thus EUF-CMA security is applicable. In the generic group model introduced by Shoup [35] , the adversary operates on the group through a group oracle that allows computation of the group law, inversion and checking for equality. The adversary only receives random identifiers of group elements he either receives as input or computes through use of the oracles. See Appendix C.1 for the proof. We additionally require that issuing and verification of signatures through BlindSign and BlindVerify is unlinkable. More precisely, the signer/verifier should learn nothing from the interactions that allows him to link the signature verified during BlindVerify to a particular interaction of BlindSign. Note that unlinkability only holds between signing and verifying, engaging the verifying protocol twice for the same signature is linkable. Theorem 6.3. The protocol BlindSign is perfectly blind if Π 1 is composable perfect zero-knowledge, PC is perfectly hiding and H is a random oracle. It additionally allows for extraction of the signed message if Π 1 has witness-extended emulation. Theorem 6.4. The protocol BlindVerify is composable zero-knowledge if Π 2 is composable zero-knowledge, PCB is hiding, the DDH assumption holds in G and H is a random oracle. It additionally has witness-extended emulation if Π 2 has witness-extended emulation.
For the proofs see Appendix C.2.
Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of BBW by measuring execution times and network payload of a practical implementation. Since data transmission times largely depend on external factors and the instantiation scenario, we exclude them from our measurements and instead provide estimates based on NFC with its maximum transmission speed of 424 kbit/s. Evaluation is done on a modern smartphone featuring a Snapdragon 845 (4 × 2.8 GHz & 4 × 1.77 GHz) and running Android 9. The implementation was done in C++17 and employs the RELIC toolkit v0.5.0, an open source library with support for elliptic curve arithmetic [4] , for underlying group operations.
In order to compare the performance of BBW with BBA+ we also implemented BBA+ with support for 16bit range proofs as described in [21] and measured execution times on the same platform.
Note that a modern smartphone represents a particularly strong device in embedded computing. To obtain performance estimations for smart cards (or other low-end micro controllers), we count the number of multiplications done and estimate the execution time based on the performance of a dedicated ECC coprocessor [36] and the MultOS card. Note that this coprocessor was designed for fast pairing execution and was thus optimized for Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curves. Although the authors also supplied performance estimates for Curve25519, their processor does not make use of the special form of Curve25519 that would allow for faster arithmetic. A dedicated coprocessor for either Curve25519 or FourQ curves [15] should result in much faster implementations, especially as FourQ curves can achieve significantly higher performance than Curve25519 [28] .
Implementation Details
To obtain small group elements (and thus minimize network payload) and fast computation times, we chose to use the elliptic curve Curve25519 ( [8, 9, 27] ) which provides 128 bit of security. For the range proofs in the Sub protocol we employ Bulletproofs by Bünz et al. [10] . The authors first construct a protocol with linear data transmission size and then extend it to provide logarithmic data size at the cost of additional prover computation time. We implemented both variants for both 16 and 32 bit ranges, referring to the variant with linear data size as Sub l,lin and to the logarithmic variant as Sub l,log in the following, where l denotes the size of the range. We suggest to use 16 bit on weak devices and 32 bit on smartphones (if needed). Table 1 shows our measurement results. The evaluation was performed utilizing a single CPU core and results are averaged over 1000 individual executions.
Evaluation

Execution Time [ms]
Transmitted Data [ While Issue and Add are highly efficient with approximately 50 ms and 60 ms respectively, the performance of Sub varies with different parameters and algorithm choices. As expected, there is a runtime-communication tradeoff when employing the logarithmic range proofs: the amount of data that has to be transmitted in total is reduced (5039 B to 3607 B for l = 32) while the computational complexity is increased tremendously (170 ms to 870 ms for l = 32). Note that, using NFC with 424 kbit/s, 3607 B are transmitted in approx. 70 ms and 5039 B are transmitted in approx. 95 ms. Even when using NFC at only 106 kbit/s (e.g. when using smart cards), the difference amounts to only about 110 ms, which is still faster than the additional computation.
Using the number of multiplications in G, we can estimate a lower bound for the execution time on other platforms. Note that we restrict our estimations to the user side, as the backend is expected to be notably more powerful. Furthermore, as these estimations are solely based on the number of point multiplications, execution times of concrete instantiations would be higher due to the remaining computations and I/O. The dedicated coprocessor by Unterluggauer and Wenger [36] takes 23 ms for a multiplication on Curve25519. On a Mul-tOS 4.3.1 card, point multiplication on ≈250 bit curves takes 61 ms [18] . The resulting estimated lower bounds for execution time of BBW are shown in Table 1 . It is worth noting that, although the MultOS card does not employ a dedicated coprocessor, the execution time is only increased by a factor of less than 3.
Discussion
Our evaluation shows that, although the logarithmic variant of Sub results in less transmitted data, the overhead in execution time is tremendous. While this may not be an issue on the smartphone, as 1 s for 32 bit ranges might be an acceptable waiting period for users, more than 5.8 s or even 15.4 s for just 16-bit ranges as in our estimations for smart cards is unacceptable. Therefore, we favor the linear variant, as the penalty of transmitting the additional data is easily outweighed by the processing time saved. Regarding the smartphone, this reduces the computation time of the user to only 170 ms for Sub 32,lin . On more constrained devices, using the linear variant and l = 16 results in promising execution times, i.e. close to 1.5 s for Sub on [36] , which may be acceptable depending on the scenario. Note that Sub without range proofs takes approximately as long as Add, and thus less than 1 s on [36] .
Comparing our implementation with the performance of BBA+, we see improvement in all areas. Regarding transmitted data, the Issue protocols are roughly equal, while for Add the transmitted data was reduced from 4208 B to 1745 B. The most notable difference is in Sub, where the amount of transmitted data was reduced from 14368 B when supporting only a 16bit range proof, to 5039 B for Sub 32,lin , i.e., supporting a 32-bit range proof. Regarding execution time and the favorable linear variant of Sub, BBW is faster in every protocol. Especially Sub 32,lin is more than four times as fast than Sub in BBA+ despite supporting 32-bit range proofs, and still twice as fast as Sub without any range proofs (where execution time is the same as in Add). Additionally, our scheme also offers a significantly faster system-side, enabling the use of weaker hardware in operator terminals (such as subway turnstiles).
Regarding practical implementations on smart cards, possible problems might arise from the amount of RAM required (which we did not optimize for on our smartphone implementation) and bad connectivity using NFC in passive mode. As almost all multiplications are fixed-point, storing pre-computation tables would allow for more efficient algorithms. However, this requires such tables for every element in the common ref-erence string, which requires somewhat large amounts of permanent storage. 
A Formal Instantiations of Building Blocks
A.1 Commitment Scheme
(m 0 , m 1 ) ← A(crs); b ← {0, 1} (C, d) ← Com(crs, m b ) : A(crs, C) = b   = 1 2
Binding: For all PPT adversaries
The commitment scheme is called additively homomorphic if the message space M is an additive group and it has an algorithm for adding commitments such that the resulting commitment can be opened to the sum of the messages.
It is called equivocable, if knowledge of a trapdoor allows opening of commitments to arbitrary messages and existence of the trapdoor cannot be detected.
We use Pedersen multi-commitments: Definition A.2 (Pedersen Multicommitments). The Pedersen multi-commitment scheme is given by: Setup(gp, l) samples x 1 , . . . , x l ← Z * p and returns crs := (H, H 1 , . . . , H l ) := (G 1 , x 1 G 1 , . . . , x l G 1 ). SimSetup(gp, l) works as Setup(gp, l), but sets td := (x 1 , . . . , x l ) as trapdoor, and returns (crs, td).
Equiv (C, d, m, td) . . . , m l ) and td = (x 1 , . . . , x l ).
Definition A.3 (Blinded Pedersen Commitment).
For the blinded Pedersen commitment, Setup adds another element Z ← G \ {0} to the common reference string, and Com calculates the commitment (γZ, γC) as described above. The unveil information consists of (d, γ).
Theorem A.4. If the DLOG assumption holds with regard to SetupGrp, the Pedersen multi-commitment scheme is an equivocable, additively homomorphic noninteractive commitment scheme and the blinded variant is an equivocable non-interactive commitment scheme.
A.2 Signatures
Definition A.5 (Signature Scheme). A signature scheme (with setup SetupGrp and message space M) is a triple (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) which satisfies correctness: ∀gp ← SetupGrp(1 n ), ∀(PK, sk) ← KeyGen(gp), ∀m ∈ M: Pr[Verify(PK, m, Sign(sk, m)) = 1] = 1 It is called EUF-CMA secure if for all PPT adversaries A with access to a signing oracle S sk we have
where Q S sk A is the set of all messages m for which A did an oracle query.
A.3 Zero-Knowledge
Definition A.6 (ZKPoK). For a polynomial time decidable ternary relation R we define the group-dependent language L gp as the set of x for which there exists w with (gp, x, w) ∈ R. We call w a witness for x. An interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge consists of PPT algorithms Setup, SimSetup, ExtSetup and interactive PPT algorithms (P, V) called the prover and the verifier. By tr = P(x), V(y) we denote the public transcript produced by the interaction between P and V, ending with V either accepting or rejecting. Moreover, we require the following properties: Perfect completeness: For all gp ← SetupGrp(1 n ), crs ← Setup(gp), (x, w) ∈ L gp : P(x, w), V(x) = 1. Composable Zero-Knowledge: There exists a simulation trapdoor and a PPT algorithm called the simulator that, when given the simulation trapdoor, can simulate the prover without access to a witness for any PPT verifier V * when given black-box access to V * in a way that even an adversary that generates the statement to be proven and is also given the simulation trapdoor has only negligible advantage in deciding whether transcripts are produced by the simulator or an actual interaction between P and V * . Additionally, existence of the trapdoor must be undetectable from the crs. Witness-Extended Emulation There exists an expected PPT extractor E that when given access to a transcript oracle of the interaction of a prover P * with the verifier V produces a transcript indistinguishable from one obtained from a real interaction between P * and V, and if the transcript is accepting also outputs a valid witness w. Note that this also implies soundness.
We extend the generic sigma protocol introduced by Maurer [29] with a Blum coin-toss to achieve concurrent zero-knowledge: Composable perfect zero-knowledge follows from equivocability of C ZK (see [16] ), the proof for witnessextended emulation is straightforward.
Definition A.9 (Bulletproof Range Proof). The Bulletproof range proof scheme consists of an PPT algorithm Setup and an interactive protocol RangeProof between a prover P and a verifier V. Setup(gp, l) generates a common reference string crs rp for the range [0, 2 l ].
RangeProof The prover P with inputs (crs rp , v, r, C) convinces the verifier V with inputs (crs rp , C) that C = Com(v; r) and that v ∈ [0, 2 l − 1].
For details on how the interactive proof is performed, see [10] .
Theorem A.10. The range proof in Definition A.9 has perfect completeness, perfect special honest verifier zeroknowledge and witness extended emulation. If the challenge is replaced by a Blum coin toss, it has perfect composable zero-knowledge.
For the proof see [10, Cor. 2] and [16] for composable zero-knowledge. such that at least one of the following conditions is satisfied: -PK
B Formal Definitions of BBA+
(1) 
Definition B.3 (False-Accusation Protection).
A trapdoor-linkable BBA+ scheme ensures false-accusation protection if for any PPT adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ) in the experiment Exp facp BBA+,A (n) from Figure 11 the advantage of A defined by
(PK I , PK U ) The experiment returns 1 iff VerifyGuilt(PK I , PK U , π) = 1.
Fig. 11. False accusation protection experiment
C Proofs for the Signature Scheme C.1 Proof of EUF-CMA Security
We make use of the following Lemma:
Lemma C.1 (Schwartz [34] ). Let p be prime and let
be a nonzero polynomial of total degree d. Then for random
Proof of Theorem 6.2. First note that because the Pedersen commitment scheme is binding and the user performed a proof of knowledge of m, the message being signed during BlindSign is well-defined. 1
In the generic group model, the adversary is only allowed black-box access to the group. More precisely, group elements are identified by uniformly random chosen handles from {0, 1} n . The adversary receives handles for the group elements in his input and is given access to oracles to compute the group law and inversion that take identifiers and return an identifier for the result.
As a first step, we modify the group oracle as follows: The oracle keeps a list of the handles (random bitstrings) the adversary receives and the internal representation of that group element. Internally, group elements are represented by polynomi-
The generator G is represented by the constant polynomial 1 and the public key PK is represented by the constant polynomial sk (where skG = PK). For each element H, Z, H 0 , . . . , H l of the common reference string a new indeterminate X H , X Z , X H0 , . . . X H l is introduced and the element is represented by the polynomial X i for the correspondent indeterminate. When the adversary queries the group law oracle on two elements F i , F j the resulting group element is represented by F k = F i + F j , and when he queries the group inversion oracle on F i , the resulting group element is represented by F k = −F i . If F k is already in the list, the corresponding handle is returned, otherwise a new one is chosen at random. After the adversary finished and outputted his solution, a random x := (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ Z k p is chosen and all polynomials are evaluated at x. During interaction, whenever a random group element is chosen (including cases where a random scalar s is chosen and the group element is computed by sY for some group element Y ) a new indeterminate X i is introduced and the element is represented as above. Whenever non-random group elements are computed, the oracle addition/inversion is used.
More precisely, during the BlindSign protocol, the adversary receives group elements A i , B 1,i , B 2,i . The A i are again represented by a polynomial in a newly introduced indeterminate X i , while B 1,i , B 2,i are represented by polynomials in existing indeterminates (and depend on the group element C i the adversary supplied).
If two distinct polynomials F i , F j evaluate to the same group element, a simulation failure occurs and we abort, otherwise this is indistinguishable to the real experiment. We call this event F G . Note that for an adversary performing q G queries to the group oracle and engaging in q sign signing protocols, there exist at most 5 + l + q G + 3q sign ≈ q G + 3q sign polynomials F i in at most 3 + l + q sign ≈ q sign indeterminates X j . Note also that the polynomials F i are of degree either 0 or 1, as for F k = F i +F j it holds that the degree of F k is at most the larger of the degrees of F i and F j , and polynomials inserted otherwise are of degree 0 or 1. Then it follows from Lemma C.1 that the probability of two polynomials F i and F j in q sign indeterminates to be equal on random x ∈ Z qsign p is at most 1 p , and as there are at most q G +3qsign 2 pairs of polynomials, we have
Then observe that an adversary has two options to come up with a valid signature:
1. For a given signature on message m obtained through interaction with the signing oracle, open the commitment (Z,C) part of the signature to a different message m 2. Generate a fresh signature by computing some group elements via the group oracle and some nongroup data that arbitrarily depends on the responses to the group and random oracles For simplicity, we first assume that no hash collisions occur, i.e. there are no queries q 1 , q 2 to the random oracle H so that H(q 1 ) = H(q 2 ). Should two such queries occur, we abort. We call this event F H (hash collision). Since H is a random oracle, for an adversary performing q H queries to H, we have
Regarding (1), note that (Z,C) uniquely defines C: For the adversary to be able to open the blinded commitment, he must supply some γ ∈ Z p so that γZ =Z and γC =C. Two different openings d and d to different messages m and m for C result in two different polynomials F and F with coefficients m, d and m , d that both evaluate to C. This constitutes a simulation failure as described above and is thus already contained in F G .
For (2), the adversary needs to forge the ZKPoK, i.e. come up with group elementsZ,C and valuesc,r,c ,r 1 ,r 2 , r 3 ∈ Z p for whichc +c = H (Z,C,Ã,B 1 ,B 2 , B 3 ) holds forÃ =rG +cPK,
We call the first part of the ZKPoK (knows sk such that skG = PK, corresponding toc) the key side and the second part (knows (w 1 , w 2 , γ) such that w 1 G = C, w 2 H = (Z −C), γZ =Z, corresponding toc ) the message side. Now for the key side, observe that the adversary only receives non-group elements of the form r i = a i + c i sk with new random a i each time, and a i and sk otherwise are only accessed through the group oracle, whose output is statistically independent of a i and sk, and thus r i is statistically independent of sk. Thus, the probability to output someÃ ∈ G and then forc dependent onÃ successfully computer for which it holds thatÃ =rG +cPK is at most q G 2 H(c) , where H(c) is the entropy ofc.
For the message side, following equations must hold:
Now, we view the group elements A uses as multivariate polynomials F i (X 1 , . . . , X l ) and rewrite the equations as
So, after evaluating the polynomials at x chosen uniformly random as mentioned above, equation (12) holds if either FB 1 and FC are both constant or only with probability 1 2 H(c ) , where H(c ) is the entropy ofc . Similarly, equation (14) holds if FZ and F B3 are both of the form r i X Z or again only with probability 1 2 H(c ) . For equation (13) to hold, both FB 2 as well as (FZ − FC ) need to be of the form r i X H , otherwise it again only holds with probability 1 2 H(c ) . But as FZ = r i X Z and FC = r j , it cannot hold that (FZ − FC ) = r k X H . Thus, the probability that equations (12) to (14) are simultaneously satisfied is only 1 2 H(c ) , and the probability that both the key-side and the message-side are simultaneously satisfied is at most
. Since it has to hold thatc+c = c and H(c) ≈ n since H is a random oracle and it holds that H(c) = H(c +c ) ≤ H(c,c ) ≤ H(c) + H(c ) we have that H(c) + H(c ) ≥ n and thus the probability of (2) is at most
So to conclude, the probability of an adversary to succeed in forging a signature is at most the sum of 1 and 2 and the failure events F G and F H . So from (7) , (8) and (15) we have
which is negligible in n since q G , q H and q sign are polynomials in n, while p ≈ 2 n .
C.2 Proofs of Blindness/Zero-Knowledge
Proof of Theorem 6.3. The only information that is sent outside the composable perfect zero-knowledge proof Π 1 is C = PC.Com(m; d) which is statistically independent of m as PC is perfectly hiding and e, which is statistically independent of m because H is a random oracle. Extraction of the signed message directly follows from witness-extended emulation of P i 1 .
Zero-Knowledge Verification
First note that because C is uniquely defined by (γZ, γC) and C was sent to the signer, the protocol only achieves computational zero-knowledge (learning C during this interaction allows linking the signature to a signing interaction, thus we need to treat C as part of the witness). We follow the proof of blindness in [5] .
Proof of Theorem 6.4. The user sends the following information to the verifier:Z = γZ,C = γC,r = r+t 1 ,c = c+t 2 ,r 1 = γr 1 +t 3 ,r 2 = γr 2 +t 5 ,c = c +t 4 , r 3 = u 3 +c γ.
The t i have all been chosen uniformly at random by the user, thusr,r 1 ,r 2 ,c,c and r 3 are all statistically independent of the values r, r 1 , r 2 , c, c sent by the signer. Additionally, it holds thatrG+cX =Ã,r 1 G+c C =B 1 andr 2 H +c (Z −C) =B 2 , butÃ,B 1 andB 2 are also statistically independent of A, B 1 and B 2 . Finally,c+c = is statistically independent of e = − t 2 − t 4 . Thus, it remains to show that any adversary that can linkZ,C to C can be used to solve the DDH problem. First, note that there are two types of signatures a simulator might output: σ = (Z,C,r,c,r 1 ,r 2 ,c , r 3 ) is correct if there exists γ such thatZ = γZ andC = γC i for some interaction i with the signer and the signature verifies. The signature σ is fake if no such γ exists (but it still verifies). It is easy for the simulator to output a fake signature with control over the random oracle: it picks randomZ,C ← G,r,r 1 ,r 2 ,c,c , r 3 ← Z p and programs the random oracle so that the signature verifies. Now, observe that an adversary able to successfully distinguish between a correct and a fake signature (with non-negligible advantage ) can be used to solve the DDH problem. We construct a reduction B as follows:
The reduction B gets as input a DDH instance (gp, A, B, D) . B then sets Z = A and H = eG and H 0 , . . . , H l to e 0 A, . . . , e l A for randomly chosen e i ∈ Z p . Then B constructs the signature asZ = D andC = kD for random k ← Z p , chooses all other values at random and programs the random oracle as explained above. (Note that as B knows the discrete logarithms of H 0 , . . . , H l and thus knows k ∈ Z p for honestly generated commitments C so that C = kA.) If (gp, A, B, D) is a DH-tuple, then it holds that A = aG, B = bG and D = abG, and thusZ = D = bA = bZ and C = kD = kbA = bC is identically distributed as a correct signature. Conversely, if (gp, A, B, D) is not a DHtuple, then (Z,C) is a fake signature. Thus, B outputs "DH" if A outputs "real" and "random" otherwise.
D Proofs for BBW D.1 Extraction
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We consider an adversary A MalIssue,MalAdd,MalSub that stopped after interacting q times with the three oracles, where q is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter.
For any successful interaction with one of the oracles (from the oracle's point of view) we extract a witness for the argument used in the interaction in the following way: We fix the randomness of A and that of all oracles. Then, starting with the interaction for which the ZKPoK was completed last, we iteratively extract witnesses one-by-one: For the interaction we want to extract, we supply the extractor E of the corresponding ZKPoK with a transcript oracle O of all messages part of the ZKPoK. Due to the witness-extended emulation property and since the interaction was successful and thus the first transcript produced is accepting, E outputs a witness with overwhelming probability in expected polynomial time.
We repeat this step for every successful oracle interaction, of which there are at most q. This results in an extraction algorithm E * with expected runtime q · t where t is the expected runtime of E. Since E has expected polynomial runtime and q is bounded by a polynomial, the resulting runtime is expected polynomial. As the probability for successful extraction is overwhelming for each interaction and the amount of interactions is bounded by q, the probability that all witnesses are successfully extracted is overwhelming.
D.2 Simulation-Linkability
We start with the requirement of P2, P3 and BlindSign being complete: Proof of Lemma D.1. We prove Lemma D.1 for P2, the proof for P3 works analog. A transcript for P2 is of the form tr =: (π 1 , c, π 2 ) where π 1 =: (T, C Z ) and π 2 = (c , d Z , r). Since tr is accepting, it holds for the group homomorphism Φ : A → B used in P2 and the statement Z that Φ(r) = T + (c + c )Z, as well as
c , d Z and C Z are part of the protocol, and the honest prover P can choose the same values. Since Z is in the image of Φ and Φ is a homomorphism, it follows that T is also in its image. Thus, there exists (at least one) x ∈ A for which it holds that Φ(x) = Z. Then, for fixed c, c and x, there exists k ∈ A such that r = k + (c + c )x and Φ(k) = T . Hence, the honest prover P with witness x and randomness k, c , d Z interacting with the honest verifier V with randomness c produce the same transcript tr.
Proof of Lemma D.2. A transcript for
BlindSign is of the form tr =: (tr Z , (A, B 1 , B 2 ), e, (c, r, c , r 1 , r 2 )) where tr Z is a transcript of the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the opening of the commitment C given as common input to the user and signer. With the same argument as in the proof of Lemma D.1 this zero-knowledge protocol is complete and there exist suitable inputs and random choices for the honest user U that lead to the same transcript tr Z . All messages sent by the signer only depend on the common input C, his own random choices and the message e, so as long as there are inputs for the honest user that lead to the same value of e, the resulting interaction leads to the same transcript tr. e is calculated as − t 2 − t 4 , where is the output of H on values depending on t 2 and t 4 , so there need to exist values for which H outputs e + t 2 + t 4 . As G is cyclic with prime order, every group element is a generator. Thus, independent of the choices of t 2 and t 4 , there exist values for t 1 , t 3 and t 5 so that α, β 1 and β 2 can be any element from G. Since H is a random oracle, for some fixed values of ζ, ζ 1 and µ, the output of H(ζ, ζ 1 , α, β 1 , β 2 , µ) is still uniformly random, and thus there exist suitable choices for t 1 , . . . , t 5 so that H(. . .) = e+t 2 +t 4 (as there are p 3 possible values for (α, β 1 , β 2 ) but only p possible values for H(. . .)).
Now we can show that our scheme is indeed simulationlinkable:
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Completeness: We need to show that any accepting transcript could be produced by interaction of an honest user U with an honest accumulator AC/verifier V when given suitable inputs and randomness. More precisely, we need to show that for all values part of an accepting transcript, there exist inputs and random choices for U and AC/V that result in these values being part of the transcript. A transcript for Add has the form tr =: (u 2 , (s, t, C , σ 1 , ), tr P 2 (C , d , s ) , tr BlindSign ). For tr P 2 by Lemma D.1, and for tr BlindSign there exist suitable inputs and random choices by Lemma D.2. s is part of the token and chosen uniformly at random during honest token generation, so any value of s can be part of a token given as input to U. t is calculated as t = sk U u 2 + u 1 , so for any user secret key sk U and any value u 2 sent by AC/V, there exists a value u 1 that results in t, which is also chosen uniformly at random during honest token generation and can thus be part of the input token. C is a Pedersen commitment on some message m . As Pedersen commitments are perfectly hiding, there exists a random choice d for any message m so that C is a commitment on m with opening information d . σ 1 =: (ζ, ζ 1 , ρ, ω, ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ω , µ) is part of a valid signature σ := (σ 1 , σ 2 := (d, γ) ). Since P2/P3 have witness-extended emulation (and are thus sound), we have that ζ = γZ and ζ 1 = γC for some commitment C (note that this fixes the choice of γ). Then, as above, there exists a random choice d for any message m so that C is a commitment on m with opening information d. Now, as the signature basically consists of a (non-interactive via Fiat-Shamir transformation) sigmaprotocol zero-knowledge proof, with the same argument as in the proof of Lemma D.1 there exist suitable inputs and random choices for which σ 1 is produced. Extractability: Since P2 and P3 have witnessextended emulation, there exists an extractor E for them. Extraction for Σ-protocols is achieved by first getting enough related transcripts and then supplying them to an algorithm KnowledgeExtractor that outputs the witness. It is thus possible to construct GenerateTranscripts and KnowledgeExtractor from E and implement ExtractUID by running KnowledgeExtractor to receive a witness x containing the user secret key sk U and then computing and outputting PK U = sk U G.
D.3 System Security
We first state the slightly modified formal definitions for security. Definition D. 3 (Oracles) . The adversary in the following security games is given access to the following oracles. MalIssue(PK U ) lets the adversary initiate the Issue protocol with an honest issuer I provided that there is no pending MalIssue call for PK U and PK U has also not been used in a successful call to MalIssue before. MalAdd(attr, v) is used by the adversary to initiate the Add protocol with honest AC for input v ∈ V. MalSub(attr, v) is used by the adversary to initiate the Sub protocol with honest V for input v ∈ V.
Definition D.4 (Owner-Binding). A simulationlinkable BBW scheme is called owner-binding if for any PPT adversary A in the experiments Exp ob-issue
BBW,A (n) and Exp ob-add-sub BBW,A (n) from Figure 12 the advantages of A defined by
are negligible in n. 
is negligible in n. We split the proof of Theorem 5.3 in separate proofs for owner-binding, double-spending detection and balancebinding.
Owner-Binding
The proof for owner-binding wrt. Issue is a straightforward reduction to the CDH problem.
Thus, it holds that A can not win this game and we have Adv game-4 BBW,A (n) = 0. Now, let us discuss the failure events. F 1 only occurs with negligible probability as BBW is simulation-linkable, so we have Pr[F 1 ] ≤ negl(n). F 2 also only occurs with negligible probability according to Theorem 5.1, so we have Pr[F 2 ] ≤ negl(n). When F 3 occurs, we extracted a valid signature σ on a message m that has never been signed. Thus, we can construct an adversary B EUF-CMA against the EUF-CMA security of S and it holds that Pr[F 3 ] = Adv euf-cma S,B EUF-CMA (n).
Putting everything together, we have
Adv ob-acc-ver BBW,A (n) = Adv game-1 BBW,A (n)
which is negligible since S is EUF-CMA secure.
Double-Spend Detection
Proof. We make use of the same sequence of games 1 to 4 as in the proof of owner-binding. Let Adv game−i BBW,A (n) = Pr Exp game−i BBW,A (n) = 1 again denote the advantage of A in Game i. We thus have that Adv game-1 BBW,A (n) = Adv dsd BBW,A (n) and Adv dsd BBW,A (n) ≈ Adv game-4 BBW,A (n) + Adv euf-cma S,B EUF-CMA (n). Now let us again consider the success probability of A in Game 4:
1 ), σ (1) be the extracted values from the call resulting in dstag 1 = (s, z 1 ) and PK (2) U , m (2) := (s (2) , w (2) , sk
1 ), σ (2) from the call resulting in dstag 2 = (s, z 2 ) respectively, with s (1) = s (2) = s. Let also z 1 =: (t (1) , u (1) 2 ) and z 2 =: (t (2) , u (2) 2 ). Note that it holds that PK (i)
There are 4 ways for A to win: Case 1 ExtractUID fails to extract a PK U for either call Case 2 PK (1)
(2) U Case 3 IdentDS(PK I , dstag 1 , dstag 2 ) = (PK U , π) Case 4 IdentDS(PK I , dstag 1 , dstag 2 ) = (PK (1) U , π) but VerifyGuilt(PK I , PK
(1) U , π) = 0 Case 1 can never happen, as we already ensured ExtractUID successfully extracts PK U for all calls, hence Pr[Case 1] = 0. In Case 2 we have two messages m (1) , m (2) that were both signed by the experiment and for which it holds that s (1) = s (2) but sk
But s (i) is chosen uniformly at random from Z p (observe that for any s ∈ Z p and uniformly randomly chosen s ← Z p it holds that s + s is uniformly random over Z p ) and thus the probability for s (1) = s (2) is at most q 2 p where q is the amount of successful calls A did to MalIssue, MalAcc and MalVer. Hence, we have Pr[Case 2] ≤ q 2 p . For Case 3, recall that we have double spending tags dstag 1 and dstag 2 with t (1) = sk
U ) if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) sk
(2) U (otherwise Case 2 is satisfied). From the definition of ExtractUID, it follows that PK (1)
2 holds with probability at least 1 − q 2 p as both are chosen uniformly at random from Z p by the Accumulator/Verifier. It remains the case that u
Again, as we already ensured that m (1) and m (2) were both signed by the experiment during a call to any oracle, this means there were two distinct calls that resulted in the same serial number s. Thus, as in Case 2, the probability for this is at most q 2 p . This leads us to Pr[Case 3 | ¬Case 2 ] ≤ q 2 p + q 2 p . Case 4 can never happen due to the definitions of IdentDS and VerifyGuilt: If IdentDS outputs (PK U , π) (and not ⊥), it computed PK U as πG, while VerifyGuilt checks whether PK U = πG. Thus Pr[Case 4] = 0. Hence, A's advantage in Game 4 is Adv game-4 BBW,A (n) ≤ 3q 2 p and we have that
which is negligible since S is EUF-CMA secure and q 2 p is negligible.
Balance-Binding
This proof closely follows the proof of [21, Thm. B.5].
Proof. We show that an adversary cannot make us miscount his balance and that he cannot claim a higher balance than what we counted.
To achieve this, we proceed in a series of games, where the first game is the real experiment and the last game is setup such that it is impossible for the adversary to win. We show that the difference between two such games is either negligible or any adversary able to differentiate between them can be used to build an adversary against one of the building blocks.
Firstly, we now explain the different games. Game 1 is the real experiment. In Game 2, if ExtractUID fails for any call to MalAcc or MalVer, the experiment aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event F 1 (ExtractUID failed).
In Game 3, when A finished running, we use the extractor E * from Theorem 5.1 to extract witnesses for all zero-knowledge proofs. More precisely, for each call to MalIssue, we extract a message m := (s , w = 0, sk U , u 1 ) and store a record (PK U , m , m * := (s out := s + s , w = 0, sk U , u 1 ), s ), where PK U is the user public key for which MalIssue was called and m * is the message for which A obtained a signature, with s being the issuers random share of the serial number. For each call to MalAcc or MalVer we extract a message m := (s , w, sk U , u 1 ) and a message m := (s in := s, w, sk U , u 1 ) together with a valid signature σ and store a record (PK U , m , m, σ in , m * := (s out := s + s , w + v, sk U , u 1 ), s ), where PK U is the public key extracted by ExtractUID and m * is the message for which A obtained a signature, with s being the issuers random share of the serial number and v the amount of points collected/redeemed. If extraction of any witness fails, the game aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event F 2 (extraction failure).
In the following we view the set of transactions as a directed graph, where each successful transaction is a vertex and there exists an edge from transaction A to transaction B, if the serial number s out from A is equal to the serial number s in of B.
In Game 4 we make sure that the indegree of every vertex associated with a call to MalAcc or MalVer is at least one, i. e. every serial number s in that appeared in a call to MalAcc or MalVer was part of a signed token generated in a previous interaction. Let rec = ( PK U ,m ,m := (ŝ in ,ŵ, sk U ,û 1 ),σ in ,m * := (ŝ out , w * , sk U ,û * 1 ),ŝ ) denote the record of the transaction considered. Then, the game checks for every successful MalAcc/MalVer transaction (containingŝ in ) if there exists a previous transaction whose record contains s out with s out =ŝ in . If no such transaction exists, the game aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event F 3 (new serial number).
In Game 5 we now make sure that the indegree of every vertex associated with a call to MalAcc/MalVer is at most one, i. e. every serial number s in that appeared in a call to MalAcc or MalVer has been signed in exactly one previous transaction. To do so, the game now additionally checks if there is more than one previous transaction containing s out such that s out =ŝ in . If at least two such transactions exist, the game aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event F 4 (serial number collision).
In Game 6 we make sure that the outdegree of every vertex is at most one, i. e. that every serial number s out is used as input in at most one other transaction. To do so, for every call to MalAcc or MalVer the game checks if there already exists another transaction containing s in with s in =ŝ in and if so aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event F 5 (double spending).
In Game 7 we now have for every MalAcc/MalVer transaction exactly one previous transaction whereŝ in was generated and signed. We now make sure that the public key PK U in each new such transaction is equal to the public key PK U from the previous transaction. If this is not the case for the first time, the game aborts and return 0. We call this event failure event F 6 (miscount).
In Game 8 we check for over-claims along the path. By now, our graph consists of unary trees, where the root of each tree represents a call to MalIssue and consecutive child nodes represent changes to the balance associated with the respective user (and we made sure that for each such tree there is exactly one user associated with the transaction, namely the one for which MalIssue was called). Now, the game first checks that for each MalVer transaction, it holds that w ≥ v (and thusŵ ∈ V). Additionally the game checks each MalAcc transaction if for its predecessor transaction record it holds thatŵ = w + v and for each MalVer transaction thatŵ = w − v. If either of these not the case for any transaction, a wrong balance has successfully been claimed and the game aborts and returns 0. We call this event failure event F 7 (wrong claim).
Let Adv game−i BBW,A (n) = Pr Exp game−i BBW,A (n) = 1 denote the advantage of A in Game i. Thus, by definition, Adv game-1 BBW,A (n) = Adv bb BBW,A (n)
Note that in Game 8, if none of the failure events occurred, what has been counted as balance for PK U up to a MalVer call coincides with the claimed balance. Hence, the adversary cannot win this game and we have Adv game-8 BBW,A (n) = 0
Since each game only differs from the previous one if the respective failure event occurred, we also have Adv game-8 BBW,A (n) = Adv game-1 BBW,A (n)− Pr Exp game−1 BBW,A (n) = 1 ∧
Now let us discuss the failure events. F 1 only occurs with negligible probability as BBW is simulation-linkable, thus
F 2 only occurs with negligible probability according to Theorem 5.1, so
If F 3 occurs, we have a serial numberŝ in that didn't occur in previous transactions. As we assume that P2 and P3 are sound, we have the signatureσ in as part of rec, which is a valid signature for the message m = (ŝ in ,ŵ, sk U ,û 1 ) that has not been signed by the experiment. Hence, we can construct an EUF-CMA adversary B EUF-CMA against S with advantage
If F 4 occurs, we have two previous records rec 1 and rec 2 both containing s out =ŝ in . As s out was computed as s + s , where s was chosen by A but s was chosen uniformly at random from Z p by the oracle, s out is uniformly random over Z p . Thus, the probability for s in1 = s in2 is at most q 2 p , where q is the amount of successful calls A did to MalIssue, MalAcc and MalVer. So we have
If F 5 occurs, we have a record rec containing s in = s in . But due to the winning conditions of A, it holds that
Pr Exp game−i BBW,A (n) = 1 ∧ F 5 = 0.
If F 6 occurs, we have a previous record rec containing PK U = PK U . As we already made sure that each serial number is only part of one signed token, which in this case must be m = (s out , w + v, sk U , u 1 ) and PK U = PK U implies sk U = sk U , the soundness of P2 and P3 means we have another messagê m = (ŝ in = s out ,ŵ, sk U ,û 1 ) and valid signatureσ in on m. Asm was never signed before, we can construct an adversary B EUF-CMA against the EUF-CMA security of S with advantage 
If F 7 occurs, there are two possibilities: there exists a MalVer transaction for which w < v (F 7.1 ) or there exists a MalAcc or MalVer transaction for whichŵ = w + v (ŵ = w − v resp.) holds (F 7.2 ). If F 7.1 occurs, we can construct an adversary B wee against witness-extended emulation of RP with advantage Adv wee RP,Bwee (n) ≈ Pr[F 7.1 ]
. For F 7.2 we again have two tokens with the same serial number that differ in another part. So with the same argument as above, we have a messagê m = (ŝ in = s out ,ŵ, sk U ,û 1 ) and signatureσ in onm, butm has never been signed (asŵ = w + v), so we can again construct an adversary B EUF-CMA against the EUF-CMA security of S with advantage
. Thus, we have
Pr[F 7 ] ≤ Adv wee RP,Bwee (n) + Adv euf-cma S,B EUF-CMA (n)
Putting everything together, we have from (19) to (26) and (29) which is negligible as we assumed S to be EUF-CMA secure and q 2 p is negligible. and crs pok (see the zero-knowledge property of the proofs and the equivocality property of PC) Thus, we have Pr[D 2 ] = 0 (32) Game 2 to Game 3 In this hop, the real zeroknowledge proofs are replaced by simulated ones. Note that the proven statements are still valid. We introduce 2 new games: in Game 2.1, only P1 proofs are replaced by simulated ones. In Game 2.2 we also replace the proofs for P2 and in Game 2.3 additionally proofs for P3 are replaced, so Game 2.3 = Game 3. Now assume there is an adversary A that can distinguish between Game 2 and Game 2.1. We argue by use of an hybrid argument with games Game 2.0 to Game 2.0.q = Game 2.1. In Game 2.0.j, the first j proofs for P1 are simulated, while all proofs from j + 1 to q are real. As A notices a difference between Game 2.0 and Game 2.0.q, there must be an index j ∈ [q] such that A can distinguish between Exp game−2.0.j
BBW,A
(n)
and Exp game−2.0.j+1
(n). We can then construct an adversary B 1−j against the composable perfect zero-knowledge property of P1. It then holds that Pr[D 2.1 ] ≤ q−1 i=0 Adv zk P 1,B1−i (n), but as we assume that P1 is perfectly composable zero-knowledge, it holds that Adv zk P 1,B1−i (n) = 0 for all i ∈ [q − 1] and thus Pr[D 2.1 ] = 0
Next, consider the hop from Game 2.1 to Game 2.2. This time the proofs for P2 are also replaced by simulated ones. We argue by use of the same hybrid argument as above: in Game 2.1.j, all proofs for P1 are simulated and the first j proofs for P2 are simulated, while proofs j + 1 to q for P2 are real. Hence we have that Pr[D 2.2 ] = Adv zk P 2,B1−i (n) = 0
The same argument can also be done for the hop from Game 2. 
Game 3 to Game 4
The difference in Game 4 is that all the commitments and signatures are replaced. We first argue about replacing the commitments: Assume there is an adversary A that can distinguish between Exp game−3 BBW,A (n) and Exp game−4 BBW,A (n). We argue by use of an hybrid argument with games Game 3.0 to Game 3.q = Game 4. In Game 3.j, the first j commitments are replaced by simulated commitments while all commitments from j + 1 to q are real. As A notices a difference between Game 3.0 and Game 3.q, there must be an index j ∈ [q] such that A can distinguish between Exp game−3.j BBW,A (n) and Exp game−3.j+1 BBW,A (n). We can construct an adversary C against the equivocality of PC that internally runs A and simulates the oracles. C has the same advantage in the equiv-exp as A in distinguishing games 3.j and 3.j In the last step, the values s and t are chosen at random (if the user has not been corrupted in the previous call). Thus, there are two cases to regard: in Case 1, the adversary has successfully corrupted the user PK U in the previous call and in Case 2 the previous oracle call for PK U was any other oracle than Corrupt. In Case 2, this changes nothing for the attacker, as u 1 is chosen uniformly at random in every interaction and thus t = sk U u 2 +u 1 is a uniformly random value as any other dependency on u 1 has already been removed in the previous games. The same is true for s = s + s where s is chosen uniformly at random. In Case 1, the adversary knows the last value of u 1 as well as s that will be used in the next interaction. As u 2 is chosen from the adversary, he can check if t = sk U u 2 + u 1 actually holds (since he also received sk U upon corruption) and whether the correct s is used. For this reason, in the interaction immediately following a corruption, the real user algorithm is used. Thus, we have Pr[D 5 ] = 0 (39)
To conclude, we have that Adv priv BBW, A (n) ≤ D 2 + D 3 + D 4 + D 5 ≤ negl(n) (40) and thus BBW is privacy-preserving.
